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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #04377-84

31 JUL 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: East Asia Warning and Forecast Meeting

Attached is my report of the 18 July East Asia Warning and Forecast Meeting. The meeting focused on Northeast Asia and was attended by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for NE Asia, Ambassador William Sherman.

Next month's Warning and Forecast Meeting will be held on 23 August 1984 at 1400 hours in room 7E62, CIA Headquarters. Please phone your attendance intentions to [redacted] by noon on 21 August 1984, and have your clearances verified to us by your security office.

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[redacted]
National Intelligence Officer
for East Asia

Attachment:
Warning and Forecast Report

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18 July 1984 East Asia Warning and Forecast Meeting

To open the meeting Ambassador Sherman presented an overview of political developments in Northeast Asia, with emphasis on those areas concerning US policy makers. These areas were then discussed with the analysts.

I. Kim Il-song's Recent Visit to Moscow -- Results

Kim's visit produced mixed results. While it produced no tangible accords or assistance it did improve the lines of communication between Pyongyang and Moscow. The Chinese do not appear alarmed by the visit or its results; however, this casual attitude could change if Moscow were to significantly increase military aid to North Korea.

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Forecast

Kim will work to maintain a balance between China and the Soviet Union while maintaining independence from both. He will particularly seek to avoid friction with China because of the growing ties between Beijing and Washington and the possible role China could play if North/South reunification talks ever begin.

II. Evidence on the North Korean Nuclear Reactors

Because US-South Korean reaction to the North's nuclear program will rely on our recent estimates, an appreciation of how much confidence we have in the accuracy of our prediction of reactor completion and capability is important to policy makers.

The estimate of reactor size and capability published in April 1984 is still current. Our confidence in that estimate remains high. Estimates of plutonium production capabilities now are under way. We believe that, when completed, the reactor will be able to produce significant quantities of plutonium.

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Forecast

Current indicators do not identify this reactor as part of a weapon production program. The timing of weapon development programs are dependent on the status of reactor construction and operation levels. The reactor, which should be complete in 3-4 years, must operate for some time to produce adequate amounts of plutonium to use in the production of weapons.

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